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ON THE PROBLEM OF PARADISE
Laura Frances Callahan

Benton, Hawthorne, and Isaacs (BHI) claim that evil must be evidence against
God’s existence, because the absence of evil would be (presumably excellent) evidence for it. Their argument is obviously valid on standard Bayesian
epistemology. But in addition to raising a few reasons one might doubt its
premise, I here highlight the rather misleading meaning, in BHI’s argument,
of evil’s being evidence against God. BHI seek to establish that if one learned
simply “that there was evil,” perhaps via an oracle, one would gain evidence
of some strength or other against God. But when we commonly observe that
there is evil in the world, we learn a stronger proposition. And determining
the evidential impact of that stronger proposition is not so easy. The interesting questions about the evidential impact of even a general awareness of evil
in the world remain open.

1. Introduction
Is evil in the world evidence against the existence of God?1 Many—both
theists and atheists—think so. Of course, such theists may maintain that,
on balance, the totality of evidence bearing on God’s existence points
in the other direction. But some—notable recent representatives being
Daniel Howard-Snyder and Michael Bergmann (hereafter HSB)2—think
we should not take evil to be evidence against God’s existence at all. When
we weigh up considerations for and against theism, evil ought not even
to come into play. Roughly, this is because we have no good reason for
thinking evil confirms atheism over theism.
In a highly interesting recent paper, Matthew Benton, John Hawthorne,
and Yoaav Isaacs (hereafter BHI) evaluate many of the dialectical moves
and arguments in recent literature on evil and evidence.3 However, in
what follows I will focus exclusively on one point they make. BHI attempt to meet HSB’s challenge to provide good reason for thinking evil
1
More fully, “Is the proposition that there is evil in the world evidence against the proposition that God exists?” For the purposes of this paper, I will assume that propositions are
what confirm and are confirmed in evidential relationships, and I will follow the literature
in using nouns and noun phrases (“evil in the world,” “the existence of God”) as shorthand
for those propositions.
2
Howard-Snyder and Bergmann, “Evil Does Not Make Atheism More Reasonable Than
Theism.”
3
Benton, Hawthorne, and Isaacs, “Evil and Evidence.”

pp. 129–141

FAITH AND PHILOSOPHY Vol. 33 No. 2 April 2016
doi: 10.5840/faithphil201631556
All rights reserved

Faith and Philosophy

130

confirms atheism over theism by inviting us to consider what they call the
“problem of paradise.” Their argument purports to establish that evil is
evidence against God’s existence.
If it were successful, this argument would seem to establish an important conclusion. BHI are careful not to claim that evil is decisive or even
strong evidence against God’s existence; however, their claiming that it is
definitely evidence of some strength or other is still quite interesting. But
it seems to me that one may well doubt their argument’s success. First,
dialectically, it is not an effective argument against radical skeptical theists
like HSB who (it seems) should simply deny its premise. Indeed, I will
argue that even if one isn’t a radical skeptical theist, one might well doubt
BHI’s needed premise. Moreover, even if one takes the argument to be
sound, one should note that what BHI think “evil being evidence against
God” amounts to is a somewhat unintuitive, highly qualified claim. Their
conclusion, then, understood in the qualified way in which they mean it,
seems not to engage with the reasons that most philosophers (and theists)
have wondered whether evil constitutes such evidence.
I will proceed by first reviewing the arguments from HSB and BHI in
section 2. Then I will comment very briefly on BHI’s dialectical effectiveness against radical skeptical theism in section 3. In section 4, I review
some basic facts about what rational agents do when they learn a proposition in various ways, and then in sections 5 and 6, I argue that a realistic
construal of learning about evil does not have the result that rational
individuals definitely should treat evil as evidence against God. Before
closing, in section 7 I note a separate objection to BHI’s argument: that
atheism as they conceive of it is too broad and amorphous to obviously
predict much.
2. Arguments from HSB and BHI
HSB present their argument as follows:4
(1) Grounds for belief in God aside, evil makes belief in atheism more reasonable for us than belief in theism only if somebody has a good argument that displays how evil makes atheism more likely than theism.
(2) Nobody has a good argument that displays how evil makes atheism
more likely than theism.
(3) So, grounds for belief in God aside, evil does not make belief in atheism
more reasonable for us than belief in theism.

Now, a few clarifications: for HSB—and throughout this paper—
“theism” is just the proposition that God—i.e., a unique omniscient,
omnibenevolent, omnipotent creator of the universe5—exists. It is not as
HSB, “Evil Does Not Make Atheism More Reasonable Than Theism,” 14.
HSB themselves don’t clarify the claim “God exists.” But they are directly responding
to an essay by Rowe, who writes, “Theism is the view that there exists an all-powerful,
all-knowing, perfectly good being (God)” (Rowe, “Evil is Evidence,” 4). BHI, likewise, are
4
5
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clear what they mean by “atheism.” But BHI, in objecting to HSB’s argument, take atheism to be just theism’s negation.6 Also, given that HSB are
attempting to establish the evidential irrelevance of evil, we ought to understand their repeated use of the clause “evil makes atheism more likely
than theism” as something like, “evil raises the likelihood of atheism over
theism,” or, “evil confirms atheism over theism.” Whether evil makes
atheism more likely overall is clearly a further issue. Understood this way,
BHI deny premise 2. They claim they are in possession of a good argument
that displays how evil confirms atheism over theism.
Their argument employs formal Bayesian models, in which “a piece
of evidence is evidence for a hypothesis just in case that evidence raises
the probability of that hypothesis . . . just in case that evidence is likelier
to come about if the hypothesis is true than if the hypothesis is false.”7
Of course, both “evidence” and “probability” are understood variously—
controversies which neither BHI nor HSB address explicitly. It seems
charitable (or at least harmless) to understand BHI as discussing normative
subjective probabilities. BHI will argue that evil is evidence against God,
meaning roughly that rational agents downgrade (to some, perhaps tiny,
degree) credence in God’s existence because of it.8
BHI’s crucial claim—what I have referred to in the introduction as their
“premise”—is that the absence of all evil is epistemically likelier to come
about if theism is true than if atheism is. This will be intuitively compelling, the story goes, for anyone who reflects on paradise.
Consider a world of pleasures with no pain, of goods with no evil—an
Eden. If the world were like that, then we think that would constitute a
fairly overwhelming argument for the existence of God. . . . But if the probability of God is higher given the complete absence of evil (in an Edenic

clearly attempting to weigh in on existing arguments (including, in the problem of paradise
argument discussed here, HSB’s own). In a footnote, they claim:
Unless otherwise noted, we use the term ‘God’ in a fairly loose, minimal way.
Our arguments are consistent with, but do not presuppose, the traditional conception of God as omniscient, omnipotent, and omnibenevolent. For these purposes,
take the hypothesis that God exists to be the hypothesis that an extremely knowledgeable, extremely powerful, extremely benevolent being exists (BHI, “Evil and
Evidence,” 1n2).
6
BHI’s explanation of the problem of paradise argument (“Evil and Evidence,” 5), where
they consider theism as an instance of “H” and atheism as an instance of “~H,” commits
them to this definition.
7
BHI, “Evil and Evidence,” 3–4, emphasis mine.
8
BHI do not in the problem of paradise section address the situation in which a reasonable person antecedently knows, is certain, or even (flat-out) believes that God exists, and the
limitations on their argument I wish to press will not appeal to these possibilities. (BHI do
however discuss the possibility of knowing theism to be true in section 12.1 of their paper.)
Moreover, BHI do not weigh in on cases in general where one has irrational priors (although
they do consider one case of odd priors; “Evil and Evidence,” 6n15). The claim is not that for
any agent, regardless of her priors, rationality requires downgrading confidence in theism.
Rather, it’s something like: for agents with roughly normal or rational priors, rationality will
require their downgrading confidence.
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world), then the presence of evil (as in our world) must reduce the probability of God.9

Note that one need not make any particular probability assignments
about the likelihood of evil on theism and atheism in order for this to be
convincing; one need only make a certain comparative judgment about
those probabilities. (“Paradise” is likelier conditional on theism than on
atheism.) And that comparative judgment does seem, perhaps, difficult
to deny. But once one has granted that the absence of evil is evidence for
theism (i.e., it’s more likely to occur on theism than on atheism), one must
also conclude that the presence of evil is evidence against theism. After all,
if the absence of evil is likelier to occur on theism than on atheism, then the
presence of evil must be likelier on atheism than on theism.
To help illustrate how BHI are thinking of evidence and the importance
of relative likelihoods, I will include here the helpful diagrams from the
following section of their paper, depicting what happens when we rational
agents learn there is evil in the world.10 We start with some assignment of
prior probabilities to the world being in each of the following four states:
Theism

Theism

Atheism

Atheism

No evil

Evil

No evil

Evil

[1]

[2]

[3]

[4]

Then, upon learning that there is evil in the world, we eliminate [1] and
[3].
Theism

Theism

Atheism

Atheism

No evil

Evil

No evil

Evil

[1]

[2]

[3]

[4]

Now, having observed evil, we are certain that the world is either as in
[2] or [4]. Standard Bayesian updating requires that we then preserve the
ratio of our prior probabilities for [2] and [4], but “expand” these to cover
100 percent of our epistemic probability space.11
The prior probability for theism was, before learning there is evil
in the world, just P([1]) + P([2]). The prior probability for atheism was
P([3]) + P([4]). But now the probability for theism is just P([2]), and that
for atheism just P([4]). Whether the probability for theism drops in this
BHI, “Evil and Evidence,” 4–5.
Diagrams from BHI, “Evil and Evidence,” 6–7. I have followed BHI in making each
numbered section an equal size. Although proportional sizes would have aided visualization, I am not comfortable making assumptions about how large these boxes should be with
respect to theism and atheism. Some of my reasons for this will become clear in section 6.
11
See van Fraassen (Laws and Symmetry, 161–162) on “Muddy Venn Diagrams.”
9

10
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maneuver depends entirely on whether P([3]) was a smaller percentage
of the total prior probability for atheism than P([1]) was of the total prior
probability for theism. Or in other words, it depends on whether theism
lost a bigger portion of its probability space when [1] and [3] dropped out.
When BHI present the problem of paradise, they are actually inviting
us to consider the opposite maneuver. What if, instead of eliminating [1]
and [3] on finding evil in the world, we had found ourselves in “paradise”
and so eliminated [2] and [4]? Well, BHI think this would obviously confirm theism. So, [4] must be a bigger portion of atheistic probability space
than [2] is of theistic probability space. This entails, mathematically, that
[3] is a smaller portion of atheistic probability space than [1] is of theistic
probability space. Hence, say BHI, evil is evidence against God.
3. Dialectical Limitation: Skeptical Immunity
Now, this “problem of paradise” argument may beg the question against
BHI’s putative target interlocutors. As I understand them, HSB and other
radical skeptical theists are convinced of the epistemic probabilistic independence of theism and the world’s being in any certain state with respect
to goods and evils. If this is correct, they can simply deny that BHI’s
comparative claim about the likelihood paradise on theism vs. atheism
“sounds right,” or at least that this is significant. After all, they might say,
these probabilities are unfathomably complex matters, and even making a
comparative judgment of the kind BHI suggest requires an ability to assess
modal and moral facts that we simply don’t have.12 The proper response to
BHI’s suggestion might seem to be a shrug, not a nod. Dialectically, then,
BHI’s problem of paradise would fail as a response to HSB.
BHI do acknowledge this important limitation, noting “our arguments are not compatible with radical uncertainty about the probabilities
involved.”13 However, presumably BHI expect that many (including perhaps
some less-radical “skeptical theists”) will find their particular judgment
about the comparative likelihood of paradise on theism vs. atheism highly
intuitive and difficult to deny. They also attempt to dissuade readers from
the radical uncertainty that would block their argument by, following
others in the recent literature on skeptical theism, drawing attention to
the way such uncertainty seems to commit us to skepticism on other matters.14 To those who (perhaps swayed by BHI’s other arguments) are not
12
See HSB (“Evil Does Not Make Atheism More Reasonable Than Theism,” 22). See also
Peter van Inwagen (The Problem of Evil, 115–116), who defends a similarly extreme modal/
moral skepticism.
13
BHI, “Evil and Evidence,” 14.
14
See, e.g., BHI, “Evil and Evidence,” 15; Hasker, Triumph of God, 121; Maitzen, “The Moral
Skepticism Objection to Skeptical Theism”; Maitzen, “Agnosticism, Skeptical Theism, and
Moral Obligation”; O’Connor, “Theistic Objections to Skeptical Theism”; Wilks, “The Global
Skeptical Response to Skeptical Theism.” See also Howard-Snyder (“Epistemic Humility,
Arguments from Evil, and Moral Skepticism” and “Agnosticism, the Moral Skepticism Objection, and Commonsense Morality”) for an interesting defense of skeptical theism against
the charge of requiring moral skepticism.
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radical skeptics about moral and modal reasoning with probabilities, BHI’s
problem of paradise argument may indeed seem convincing.
I say “may” and “seem.” In what follows I want to examine two reasons
to worry about their argument that make no appeal to our total inability to
make the relevant kinds of modal or moral judgments.15
4. Interlude: Learning a Proposition
BHI are asking us to think about the impact on rational individuals of
learning that there is evil in the world. In this section, I want to call attention to the fact that there are many ways to learn that there is evil in
the world (to learn any proposition, in fact). For example, I suppose one
could be told the proposition by some highly reliable testifier—perhaps
an oracle. Alternatively, one could simply observe one’s own or others’
pain and conclude that there is evil in the world. But each of these methods
of learning that there is evil would result in a different total strength of the
proposition learned. From an oracle one could perhaps glean the bare fact
that there is some evil, but from observation one will gain knowledge of
particular evils as well. There is, then, the possibility that what is actually
learned in various learning-about-evil scenarios will have different effects
on the credence adjustments of rational individuals.
It may be helpful to illustrate this possibility with an example. Imagine
that you are going to be given a cake tonight. It’s your birthday, and your
friend Sue is coming over, having promised to bring you one. You know
that it’s going to be one of three kinds: chocolate, coconut, or lemon. You
also know that she will not fail to bring some sort of sauce or topping—
either whipped cream or gelato. If she brings chocolate or coconut cake,
then it will probably be whipped cream—but just possibly gelato. On the
other hand, if she brings lemon, then she will likely bring gelato. You are
secretly hoping to have her gelato, but you really have no idea which of
the three sorts of cake she will bring.
Now, I want to make a distinction between two ways you might learn
that Sue is not going to be bringing chocolate cake tonight. You might be
told, in conversation with a highly credible source (perhaps Sue herself),
“I’ll give you a hint—it’s not going to be the chocolate this time.” If that
happened, you would rationally adjust your credences by eliminating the
possibility of chocolate and renormalizing (i.e., increasing your credence
in each of the other possibilities so that they collectively sum to 1, in a way
that preserves the initial ratios among them). And this would look structurally similar to the exercise BHI recommend above. Gelato is likelier than
it was before given that Sue is not bringing chocolate, because the (now
eliminated) regions of probability space in which Sue brings chocolate

15
Nor will I object to any particular interpretations of probability or evidence mentioned
in the previous section. In general, I am attempting to see what we should think of BHI’s
argument even if we are happy to consider it largely on BHI’s own turf.
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constituted a larger percentage of the total regions in which she brings
whipped cream than of those in which she brings gelato.
But there’s another way you could learn Sue will not be bringing chocolate cake: by learning the stronger proposition that instead she will be
bringing coconut cake. This is a very simple point, but the illustration will
prove helpful. If Sue walks in displaying a coconut cake but with its accompanying topping still packed away out of sight, you will adjust your
credence that she has brought gelato down.
Intuitively, both of the scenarios just described are ones in which you
learn that Sue isn’t bringing chocolate cake. But because the ways you learn
this in each scenario differ, and specifically because in the second scenario
you “simultaneously” learn a stronger proposition, these scenarios require
different rational adjustments to your assessment of the probability of
having gelato.
Similarly, I want to stress that what one actually learns when one learns
about evil in the world (i) will be a stronger proposition than merely “that
there is some evil,” and (ii) may not obviously or necessarily require a
negative adjustment to one’s credence in theism.
5. A New Proposition to Consider: M
To show this, I don’t need to make any contentious empirical claims about
the very specific propositions people learn about evil or their evidential
impact. Instead I will consider an extremely weak proposition, one almost as weak as the bare fact that there is some evil. (In the next section
I will briefly defend the claim that we need to consider a proposition at
least this strong, in thinking about the evidential impact of evil.) Here
my aim is just to introduce the proposition and address a few possible
misunderstandings.
BHI’s partitioning of probability space into “Evil” and “No evil” worlds
seems to me to ignore an important and relevant distinction among the
former. BHI invite us to consider the existence of an Edenic “paradise”
(henceforth “P”), and I grant here that this is a coherent possibility. But
there’s another extreme possibility worth considering: the world being a
cruel wasteland (henceforth “W”), where there is absolutely no beauty or
joy or comfort or kindness or love—only much suffering and evil.
I claim that, intuitively, such a possibility is at least as coherent as P.
In support, I’d like first to point out that P itself isn’t terribly coherent.
BHI instruct us to imagine P as follows: “Hold fixed as best as possible
the amount and kinds of goodness of our world, but remove all the evil
and suffering.”16 I am not at all sure how to follow these instructions.
(For example, am I allowed to “hold fixed” goods like compassion, or the
pleasures of hard-won achievement, despite the fact that these logically
entail some suffering? Moreover, wouldn’t a true “Edenic paradise” (BHI’s
other gloss on P) contain not only less evil but more good than our current
16

BHI, “Evil and Evidence,” 4n12.
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world?) Given that their description of P is nonspecific and problematic, I
take it that W’s being “as coherent” does not require much. I am roughly
thinking of W as the world that results when we hold fixed (and maybe
also increase) the amount and kinds of evil and suffering in the world, but
remove all goodness. Note that both P and W are additionally, notoriously
problematic if we slip into thinking of these as maximally good and bad
worlds.17
Also, note that the idea is not that the world in W is similar to Hell, on
a classical Christian understanding. It is not built into W that any sentient
beings in the world are being tortured by God or any supernatural being,
just as it is not built into P that all sentient beings in the world are being
supernaturally blessed.
If W is at least as coherent as P, then it seems natural to me to distinguish at least three important possibilities where BHI identify two: no evil
(P), total or extreme evil (W), and “some” or “middling” evil (M).18 I take
it this is a more helpful way to partition our epistemic probability space.
This is true at least in part because, as I argue below, it better isolates what
we learn about evil in realistic learning scenarios. And if this is the case,
then we need to distinguish between two importantly different ways of
learning that one is not in P: either one learns it simply—perhaps from a
credible source, via testimony; or one learns specifically that one is in M.
6. Learning Too Much
The only realistic or common way to observe that one is not in paradise
(~P) is via observing, specifically, that there is some middling level of evil
in the world (M), or in other words that the world is a good-and-bad place.
Consider the temporality of this learning process. Even if such learning
happens very quickly, one is unlikely to hit upon evil in isolation. A
human life that has reached some age at which observation is possible
will, presumably, have experienced nourishment and human touch, at a
minimum. But I do not want to get mired in early childhood psychology.
My basic point is that the world is a mixture of good and evil (M), and
it presents itself as such. We learn ~P (and, as it happens, ~W) by rapid
deduction from M, or from “the strange mixture of good and ill which
appears in life.”19
Note that this method of learning resembles the version of my cake
example in which Sue walks in, not only without a chocolate cake, but with
the coconut instead. What happens to the idealized Bayesian agent when

17
On some views of evil, on which it is a privation, the difficulties raised by maximally bad
or evil worlds may differ from those raised by maximally good ones. However, it would be
odd, to say the least, if the effectiveness of BHI’s argument depended on any specific view of
evil. Thanks to Donald Bungum for raising this issue.
18
This is oversimplifying, of course. There are in fact infinitely many possibilities—“M” is
a broad family of ways the world might be.
19
Hume, Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion, XI, 113.
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she learns M? Borrowing from BHI’s illustrations, she would perform the
following elimination:
Theism

Theism

Theism

Atheism

Atheism

Atheism

P

M

W

P

M

W

[5]

[6]

[7]

[8]

[9]

[10]

In order for this operation to disconfirm theism, it would have to be
the case that (P([5]) + P([7])) is a greater proportion of the total prior probability of theism than (P([8]) + P([10])) is of the total prior probability for
atheism. Now, there are some prior probability distributions for which
this would be the case. But is it obvious that this will be the case, for each
and every rational prior probability distribution?20 In their paper, BHI appealed to the simple idea that P is more likely on theism than atheism, and
therefore they could claim, “There is a wide range of reasonable-seeming
probability assignments for which our reasoning holds.”21 But there is no
similar, intuitively compelling comparison of the likelihood of “either P
or W” occurring conditional on theism vs. atheism. After all, perhaps W
seems far more likely on atheism than on theism, and this tipping of the
scale would compete with the opposing weight that, as BHI claim, stems
from the “problem of paradise.”
Now, one might think W actually seems more likely on theism, given
that the worst worlds we can imagine contain something like specifically “Dante-an” horrors—horrors for which the existence of God seems
required. But this objection seems to derive much of its force from a confusion. Remember that the use of “theism” and “atheism” is quite artificial
here; the distinction does not map neatly onto the divide between “supernatural” and “natural” worldviews. Atheism actually encompasses
versions of pantheism and also, e.g., theories on which there is a unique
and omnipotent but evil, hateful creator. The question to focus on is: is the
worst world (W) more likely on the supposition that there is a unique,
good God, or on the supposition that there is any other arrangement “in the
heavens?”22 And I submit that, even if the latter answer is not obvious, it is
certainly plausible. Once we have to take into account the effects of eliminating both P and W, it is simply not clear that finding middling evil in
the world should reduce a rational person’s credence in theism. This is just
an instance of the non-monotonicity of evidence in general; whether ~P

20
I do not mean to weigh in here on whether there can be more than one rational set of
priors. My argument will work in either case.
21
BHI, “Evil and Evidence,” 7.
22
The probability of W on atheism will be affected not only by the various versions of
atheism but also their relative probabilities. Still it seems reasonable to think the probability
of W on atheism could be higher than on theism.
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confirms atheism does not settle whether M or the stronger propositions
about evil we actually learn do likewise.23
But perhaps, instead of idealizing our common learning-via-observation
of the world, BHI want to model an even more highly idealized, oracledelivery sort of learning. One has no idea whether or not there is evil in
the world, and one learns (simply) that there is. One updates accordingly,
redistributing one’s credences between W and M.
The primary issue with this construal of BHI’s argument is that the
extraordinary character of the imagined learning process renders it irrelevant to the interesting, ongoing debate at hand over the evidential impact
of facts about evil.
What is at stake, when we ask whether evil is evidence against God?
What do we really want to know? Well, we might want to know whether
learning about particular evils in the world always constitutes evidence
against God’s existence; then BHI’s argument would clearly be irrelevant.
They are instead concerned with something like a general awareness of
evil. But let’s grant that the evidential impact of a general awareness of
evil is also interesting. We might indeed want to ask, “Is there-being-evilin-general evidence against God?”
But even in asking that question, I (at any rate) would want to know
something importantly, subtly different than the proper response to
learning that there is evil from an oracle. I would want to know whether
people, insofar as they are rational, must at some point downgrade their
assessment of the probability of God’s existence in light of what they actually learn about evil in the world. Must a general awareness of evil sit on
the negative side of an evidential scale, so that we say things like: “When
I think about [the testimony of a trusted community, the fine-tuning argument, and “religious” or “spiritual” experiences I’ve had] it seems to me
quite likely that God exists. But then when I think about what I’ve learned
about evil in the world, I step that back (a little bit, or a lot)”?
The problem is that BHI’s argument is not straightforwardly relevant to
that question, either. What we learn about evil in the world is much richer
than ~P; it’s certainly at least as strong as M. And M—the fact that there is
some middling amount of evil in the world—may, but certainly does not
obviously or necessarily, require negatively adjusting one’s probability for
God’s existence. Call this the “realistic learning” limitation on BHI’s argument; their conclusion properly understood is just silent on what rational
agents should do with facts about evil in even halfway realistic learning
scenarios.
7. Atheism As a Predictor
Finally, allow me to return to a point I made in the previous section and
explain why I take this to ground a true objection to the soundness of
23
For a statement of monotonicity and discussion of some of the trouble such an assumption
can cause, see Fitelson and Hawthorne, “The Wason Task(s) and the Paradox of Confirmation.”
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BHI’s argument, no matter how limited we allow its conclusion to be.
BHI’s treating “atheism” as the negation of traditional monotheism
renders judgments about what would be likely conditional on atheism
extremely difficult to make. Atheism, for them, is just too broad a hypothesis to predict much. Although I have so far tried insofar as possible to
accept many of BHI’s assumptions and intuitions, I think that once one
fully appreciates what is needed in order to assess the likelihood of some
piece of evidence conditional on atheism—i.e., considering its likelihood
on all disparate “worldviews” other than traditional monotheism and
then accounting for the relative likelihoods of those worldviews—one
may well be skeptical even of BHI’s “intuitive” judgment in the problem
of paradise. Is paradise really more likely on theism than on its negation,
given that its negation includes forms of pantheism, belief in Life Forces,
etc.? The more I think about it, the less sure I am. Call this the “too-broad
competitor” objection.24
Now, if BHI were to redefine atheism more naturally, their judgment
that paradise would confirm theism over atheism would be more difficult
to deny (for those of us who aren’t radical skeptical theists, anyway). But
note, first, that my “realistic learning limitation” would remain in force
for the imagined reconstruction. And second, note that paradise might
then also seem to confirm other competing worldviews relative to theism
or atheism (a certain, very happy pantheism, perhaps). If this were the
case, BHI still could not claim that learning one is not in paradise (as from
an oracle) should definitely lower one’s confidence in theism. Instead it
might just lower the ratio of one’s probabilities for theism vs. atheism;
both absolute probabilities could increase.
8. Conclusion
BHI point out that if paradise is more likely on theism than on its negation (a somewhat dubious premise, given the dialectical limitation and the
too-broad competitor objection I’ve pressed), and we are happy to think of
“evil” as just the fact that there is some—the kind of fact one might learn
from an oracle but far too thin to be learned realistically—then, evil is
evidence against the existence of God. This is, to my mind, less interesting
or important than it might at first seem.
I claim it’s more natural to think of “evil” as the evil we learn about via
ordinary learning processes, and also more natural to think about goods
and evils in the world together. These assumptions underlie my realistic
learning limitation. In closing, I’d like to acknowledge explicitly that even
“M” is clearly far too thin a proposition to capture what we actually learn
when we observe goods and evils in the world. We don’t merely learn
that the world is both good and bad. Instead we observe particular evils
that suggest some narrow sliver of M—“about this much evil and good,
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including events X, Y, Z . . . ” Questions about the conditions under which
such a specific proposition should count as evidence against the existence
of God seem, to my mind, to lie at the heart of the interesting issues in this
debate. Unfortunately, addressing such questions properly would require
a much longer discussion.
Here, in closing, I want to just (all-too-briefly) consider one “BHI-style”
response to such questions that has been suggested to me. Could we say
(bracketing my too-broad competitor objection for the moment) that, for
all rational individuals, the worse the world is, the greater the evidence
against theism? I think not. Even if one accepts that paradise is quite likely
on theism, one needn’t think that extremely-good-but-not-perfect worlds
are at all conditionally likely. Imagine an “almost Edenic paradise” where
one person, on one day, gets a hangnail. Is that a world God would be at
all likely to create? Presumably, systemic and even substantial patterns of
evil are more likely conditional on theism, given that God would have to
have good reason for permitting any at all. Note that all theodicies and
defenses identify (possible) value in God’s allowing some evil in the world.
At any rate, many versions of theism that theists in fact find quite plausible, whether explicitly paired with theodicy or not, predict substantial
evil. (BHI explicitly acknowledge this in section 5 of their paper, where
they say evil is not evidence against Christianity.) Moreover, it is clear
that for many such actually-believed versions of theism, disconfirming
“surprises” could occur in either direction—i.e., the world could be too
good. One attracted to the classical Christian doctrine of Hell might rationally downgrade the probability of theism upon learning (somehow)
that it didn’t exist. The evidential impact of evil on theism is an extremely
complex and messy affair, best acknowledged as such.25
Rutgers University
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